It was to be as easy as ... one-two-three!
The Rangers.....
received the following tasks in their division Field Order....
1. Occupy assembly area (to be designated) after darkness night 29-30 January
1944
2. Cross LD (line of departure) at hour to be announced, move rapidly by
infiltration, seize Cisterna Di Littoria, and destroy enemy forces therein
3. Hold Cisterna Di Littoria area until relieved
Colonel Darby briefed his battalion commanders on the plan at Ranger Force headquarters
at 1800 that night.
The Ranger Force plan called for the 1st Battalion to cross the LD at
0100 hours 30 January, avoid enemy forces while infiltrating to seize Cisterna, and
destroy any enemy forces therein.
The 3rd Battalion would follow fifteen minutes later,
supporting the 1st Battalion and engaging any enemy encountered during the infiltration.
After seizing the town the two battalions were to establish a perimeter to the north of the
town and await relief. The 4th Battalion would cross the LD at 0200, advancing on
Cisterna astride the Conca-Cisterna road, clearing the route.
The Cannon Company along
with a platoon from the 601st would act as the reserve and provide support for the
4th Battalion.
The 83rd.... Chemical Battalion would provide indirect fire support.
The 3rd....
Battalion of the 15th Infantry would follow and support the 4th Battalion in its attack.
The plan called for the Rangers to use....
“previously reconnoitered routes.”
The Ranger Force had just moved from positions ten miles away to prepare for the attack, and
so was forced to rely on reconnaissance information from other units. Patrols from the
15th Infantry reported that the buildings along the Conca-Cisterna road were clear of
enemy for some distance.
Colonel Darby was worried because, “There was no.....
opportunity to send our reconnaissance patrols since we were to attack after dark the
same day.”
Major Dobson, the 1st Battalion commander, did give Company A the mission of patrolling forward for the first two miles of the infiltration route, but this was
less than half way to Cisterna.
He instructed the unit to avoid engagement except in
self-defense.
The plan was for this patrol to be picked up en-route, unless they returned
with information that the route was impassable.
The Rangers would be moving over
strange terrain, during limited visibility, to conduct their attack. An infiltration under
such conditions was possible, if the enemy positions were only scattered strongpoints
manned by weary German units, as the intelligence summary indicated.
That night, the Ranger Force headquarters was moved forward to occupy a house
near the line of departure.
The 1st and 3rd Battalions completed their preparations for
the infiltration, studying maps, distributing ammunition and sharpening knives. Generous
amounts of bazooka ammunition and sticky bombs were taken in anticipation of an
armored counterattack, but curiously, the machine guns were left behind.
Darby reported the men in good spirits as they marched approximately seven miles from the
assembly area to the line of departure.
The Ranger commanders held a final conference at midnight,
confirming the plan and reiterating that radio silence would be maintained until the 4th
Battalion crossed a phase line which ran east through Isola Bella, about two miles from
Cisterna.
At 0100 the 1st Battalion crossed the LD to the accompaniment of German
interdicting fire on the Conca road junction, to be followed by the 3rd Battalion fifteen
minutes later.
The terrain between Anzio and Cisterna was billiard table flat, with little
cover or concealment other than the scattered farmhouses and drainage ditches.
The long winding column of Rangers entered the west branch of the Mussolini canal and then
used the Pantano Ditch, which runs to the right of the Conca-Cisterna road, for cover.
No contact was made as the Rangers successfully bypassed the initial German outposts.
The infiltration was off to a good start.
At 0200 30 January 1944, the 4th Battalion crossed the LD and advanced north
along the Conca-Cisterna road in an approach march formation.
The Battalion Journal......records the initial hours of the action. The order of march within the battalion was C, D, HQ, A, B, E, and F companies.
After twenty minutes the battalion moved 500 yards to the right flank and continued to advance parallel to the road. At approximately 0300
Company C received machine gun fire from the front. Company C immediately deployed
to the left flank while Company D moved to the right.
But the German positions were well sited with good defensive protection, and by 0315, both companies were pinned down in a cross fire.
Companies A and B were similarly pinned down when they tried to
flank the position to the east.
Darby reports.... that this was his first intimation that all was....
not well, and that the intelligence reports of light resistance might not be accurate.
Doggedly the Rangers continued to work along the route, clearing enemy
resistance from houses, farm buildings and dug-in emplacements.
At one point they.....
encountered an improvised road block made up of two damaged jeeps and an Italian
truck.
The infiltrating battalions of the 7th and 15th Regiments also ran into trouble....
almost immediately. Both units ran into strong German resistance just north of the LD
and their stealthy infiltrations were transformed into intense firefights with all companies
heavily engaged.
The 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions continued to sneak along the Pantano ditch
while all hell broke loose behind them!
The two Battalions suffered their own problems....
however. The formation was strung out, single column, along the covered position offered by the ditch. The lack of training amongst some of the replacements was tested by
the darkness and muddy terrain. Some inadvertent noises carried through the night as
Rangers slipped or banged their equipment. Despite these problems, the units bypassed
several German units, including artillery, mortar, and machine gun positions.
At one point, about two miles from Cisterna, a break in contact occurred between the two
battalions. When the trail three companies of the 1st Battalion discovered the error,
they halted to try and establish contact with the rear battalion. This caused another break
within 1st Battalion as the three lead companies continued their movement. Runners
worked frantically to reestablish contact as the force raced against the coming dawn.
The Rangers continued to feel their way forward. The night was often split by the
thunder of artillery while tracers and flares from the fighting near the LD lit the night sky.
At one point the lead company was halted by German traffic on the Conca road. Major
Dobson heard the capture of a large motorized patrol element. This was later identified
as a platoon of forty-three men of the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop, of which only one man
escaped.
The Germans now knew there were elements to the rear of their outpost line!
Morning was fast approaching and the Pantano ditch was shallowing. The
Rangers were forced to cross to the west side of the road where another deeper ditch
provided better cover. Crossing the road by sections and reforming on the far side ate
more precious time. Attempts by the battalion commanders to contact the Force
headquarters were fruitless. The low ground and wet conditions interfered with effective
radio communications.
Back in the rear, the 4th Battalion had been involved in a running fight all night.
Dawn found the unit bogged down still short of their intermediate objective of Isola
Bella. Snipers, entrenched positions, and interlocking fire from mutually supporting
positions forced the Rangers to fight for every inch of ground as they pushed toward the
town.
At approximately 0610, Major Dobson, unable to establish contact with the Force
Headquarters, decided that speed would have to act as their security if the infiltrating
force stood a chance of entering Cisterna before full light. Accordingly the 1st Battalion
began using a series of trails that ran parallel to the Conca-Cisterna road on the west side,
skirting the Calcaprini house where a German self-propelled gun unit was bivouacked.
Elements of F Company attempted to silence the unit’s sentries, but the dawn was
shattered by the scream of a knifed German.....ending all efforts at concealment.
The infiltration had became an assault, indeed a footrace, towards the outskirts of Cisterna 800
yards away. Elements of the 1st Battalion raced through the sleeping Germans, shooting
and stabbing anything that moved.
The Rangers found themselves caught in a flat open plain, roughly triangular in
shape and one thousand yards per side, hemmed in by the Ponte Rotta road to the north
and the Conca road to the east.
These roads formed the apex of a triangle
that narrowed to a point in Cisterna. The Rangers of F Company, 1st Battalion charged
forward towards Cisterna. At the outskirts of the town they were stopped by intense small
arms fire in the area of a house that became known as the.....
“White House.”
This was as far as the Rangers were destined to penetrate. The company lost two Lieutenants killed
and two wounded in the first exchange of fire. The company began to dig in and occupy
hasty defensive positions under the leadership of the surviving noncommissioned
officers.
The company mortars quickly expended their available ammunition firing at the
Conca/Ponte Rotta intersection and fought the remainder of the day as riflemen.
Lawrence Gilbert checked the command post of the bivouacked German unit and
answered the ringing telephone to be queried...
“was ist los?” by a bewildered staff officer.
As the remaining 1st Battalion Rangers moved through the bivouac site, they
came under fire from German positions and vehicles to the north.
The first German attacks caught the Rangers on the left flank, coming from the Ponte Rotta road. Reacting to these attacks compelled E and D Companies, 1st Battalion, to move to the north and
fight off the tank-infantry teams emerging from the far side of the road.
The three leading assault companies of the 1st Battalion would remain pinned down by accurate
and intense German fire from this point.
Back in the 3rd Battalion area, German reaction was not long in coming.
Company C arrived at the Conca in the early dawn.
The Battalion headquarters element.....
was moving with the lead elements of the company.
Major Miller, the 3rd Battalion commander....
decided to move to the high ground provided by the road in an attempt to
establish radio contact with the Force headquarters.
Engrossed in his task, Major Miller failed to hear the shouted alarm as a German tank came into view and opened fire. Major Miller was killed instantly.
The company was able to fight off two tanks and a half track
with sticky grenades and bazookas, but the attack shattered C Company’s organization.
Across the Conca road, the remaining three companies of the 1st Battalion moved
to the sound of the guns, eager to get into the fight.
Company C moved to the left flank,
tying in with Company D. Company B assaulted the Calcaprini house, and after securing
it, moved into line on C Company’s left flank.
Company A extended the line to the west.....
tying in to Company B on its right.
The 1st Battalion now occupied hasty defensive
positions roughly on line from the White House in the east along the Ponte Rotta road.
A deadly game of cat and mouse began as the Rangers tried to hold the enemy infantry at
bay while attacking the marauding tanks and self propelled guns with phosphorous
grenades, sticky bombs and bazookas.
Major Dobson established the 1st Battalion command post..... in the Calcaprini
house and an aid station was started in a large shed to the rear of E Company.
Upon receiving news of Major Miller’s death by runner, Major Dobson decided to move back
along the trail system to coordinate further action with Captain Joe Larkin, now
commanding the 3rd Battalion. Before leaving, Major Dobson counted fifteen armored
vehicles burning within his sight.
With their forces split by the Conca road at first contact and the battalion
commander killed, the situation in the 3rd Battalion was more chaotic.
Company A, 3rd Battalion, followed Company A, 1st Battalion, and fell in on the left flank of the 1st
Battalion’s defensive line.
Company B became involved in a firefight with German
elements on the right flank of the trail system along the Matto creek line. They were able
to destroy a German flak wagon that had been interdicting movement around the
Calcaprini house.
Company C remained engaged with German elements along the Conca
road and the Matto creek. Companies E and F were called forward by Captain Larkin and
deployed to secure the western flank of the defensive line along the Ponte Rotta road.
Company D remained in the rear, just north of the Conca road, and provided rear security
for the force.
By approximately 0710, the Ranger Battalions were arrayed in a crescent shaped
hasty defense oriented to the north along the Ponte Rotta road while B, C, and D
Companies of the 3rd Battalion provided a semblance of rear security to the south and
east. Tanks, self propelled guns and flak wagons constantly swirled
through the area, blasting any visible Rangers before withdrawing to rearm.
Enemy....
infantry, machine guns and snipers took a heavy toll of any Rangers who exposed
themselves trying to attack the armored vehicles. A German infantry attack formed in the
south near B Company, 3rd Battalion’s position.
The Germans showed considerable skill
at fire and movement as they maneuvered against the Rangers to the north.
“This action....
definitely blocked any early orderly withdrawal to or an early linkup via Isola Bella and
the 4th Ranger Battalion-15th Infantry operations.”
Just after dawn, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions were fighting for their lives, the
4th Battalion was trying desperately to batter its way into the town of Isola Bella. At
0610 the 4th Battalion journal records that E, F and Headquarters Companies were
moving under heavy machine gun and artillery fire while there was no communication
with C, D, A, and B Companies or the battalion headquarters element.
Colonel Darby......
frustrated with the slow progress, finally committed two halftracks and two tank
destroyers in an attempt to break the deadlock.
The vehicles moved up to where the
Rangers were halted by a roadblock and attempted to flank the German position.
Unfortunately, they maneuvered right into a minefield where two of the vehicles were
lost.
The desperate nature of the situation was revealed in a telephone conversation
recorded in the 3rd Division War Room journal....
“The machine-gun fire is terrific from
both flanks. The shells are landing all over the place. Look like 170s. 4th Battalion is the
boy that is in the jam.”
Even the relentless mortar fire of the faithful 83rd Chemical
Battalion could not suppress the German defenses. A later entry at 1030 hours stated
simply......“4th Battalion well shaken up.”
Initially the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry had followed the progress of the 4th
Ranger Battalion. As the 4th Battalion’s attack ground to a halt, the commander of the
15th Infantry directed his 3rd Battalion to swing to the east of the Conca road and attempt
to follow the route of the infiltration in an effort to relieve the beleaguered Rangers and
get a sizable force into Cisterna.
This attempt was unable to make it into Cisterna in
daylight against an alerted enemy, but was able to make significant progress to the north
which would allow them to flank Isola Bella through the gap found by the infiltrating
Rangers. Although too late to save the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions, the 3rd Battalion,
15th Infantry would be able to seize Isola Bella and drive south down the road to assist
the 4th Ranger Battalion.
"Things were getting desperate for the surrounded Rangers at Cisterna." By this
time...... Major Dobson was wounded and many of the officers and senior non commissioned
officers were casualties.
The terrain, virtually devoid of cover except for the shallow
irrigation ditches, provided the Germans with excellent fields of fire and observation.
Their undisputed control of the road system radiating from Cisterna allowed them to
reposition quickly and reinforce threatened sectors. At some point communications were
established between the surrounded battalions and the Ranger Force headquarters,
although the exact time is questionable.
Even this small victory brought no solace..... as the
Rangers were unable to direct effective indirect fires on the Germans due to the proximity
of the attacking enemy and the protection offered by the excellent defensive positions
they occupied.
With all hope of reinforcement blocked along the Conca road, the 1st and 3rd
Battalions were in desperate straits.
They faced continued cannonades, mortar and
artillery barrages, small arms, and even direct fire from flak wagons all through the
morning hours.
The German forces continued to grow as fresh units, including tanks
and paratroopers from the 2nd Parachute Lehr Battalion, were thrown into the fray.
The growing numbers of Ranger wounded were moved to safer areas in the rear as the
perimeter slowly shrank under the German onslaught. The Calcaprini house, utilized as
the CP for the 1st Battalion, evolved into a strong point for the weakening defense.
Gradually the Rangers fire slackened as men expended all their ammunition. German
tanks grew bolder as the precious supplies of sticky bombs and bazooka rockets
dwindled.
Eventually small groups of Rangers were forced to surrender. The Germans
began lining up prisoners and advancing on the remaining pockets of Rangers, exhorting
them to surrender or their comrades would be killed.
The end of the Ranger’s final battle occurred in the early afternoon. Most
accounts generally agree that the main defensive line was rolled up between 1200 and
1400 hours.
The final radio contact with the surrounded Rangers was fittingly a
conversation between Colonel Darby and Sergeant Major Ehalt, one of the original 1st
Battalion Rangers, at 1215.
Ehalt, in an unhurried and unexcited voice, stated......
“Some of the fellows are giving up. Colonel, we are awfully sorry . . . . They can’t help it, because
we are running out of ammunition. But, I ain’t surrendering. They are coming into the
building now.”
The radio then went dead. Asking his staff to give him a moment alone,
Colonel Darby, the hardened combat leader, lowered his head into his hands and wept.
The surviving Rangers including my father Roy Martin Badgerow..... were herded into a nearby ravine and placed under guard.
The Germans were still battling the 3rd Division’s attack and seemed tense. When
machine guns were placed along the ravine’s rim, Roy and many of the Rangers thought they were
about to be executed. Instead, the wounded were evacuated. That evening, the remaining
Rangers would be put on trucks and begin their long journey to the interrogation points
and POW enclosures.
This battle sealed the fate of a Ranger force in the Mediterranean theatre. That
day only six of the 767 men who infiltrated into Cisterna would return to friendly lines.
Thanks For Your Service Dad!
ReplyDelete